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CONTROL OVER ULTRA VIRES ACTIVITY OF
LIQUOR BOARD
Pompei Winery, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control
167 Ohio St. 61, 146 N.E. 2d 430 (1957)
Appellant, Pompei Winery, Inc., sold wine at prices below the
minimum wholesale markings of 16% established by respondent, Board
of Liquor Control. The Board suspended appellant's permits to sell
bottled wine at wholesale pursuant to section 1, article VII of its own
regulation 3. This regulation, to the effect that:
There will be added to the "minimum base cost" [set
out previously in the regulation] of wine a wholesaler's markup
of 20% (twenty per cent) of the minimum base cost; which
price will be deemed the "minimum wholesale price" . .
was promulgated under authority of section 4301.13 of the Ohio Revised
Code which is as follows:
The board [of liquor control] may determine and fix the
minimum markups at wholesale or retail, or both, for bottled
wine, and fix the minimum prices at which the various classes
of bottled wine shall be distributed and sold in Ohio either at
wholesale or retail, or both.
The Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Appeals, and the
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Board.
Administrative action of the type here challenged must not amount
to an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority,' and it must not
be ultra vires the delegated rule-making authority.2 The first requirement
is easily met. The absence of any substantive property protection from
due process and the unlimited authority accorded the states under the
Twenty-First Amendment3 combine to sustain nearly any breadth of
delegation which a legislature sees fit to make.4 Thus in Blackman v.
Board of Liquor Control,5 the statute here in question was held consti-
I OHIo CONST., Art. II, §1.
2 Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 176, 99 A.2d 89 (19531 ; City of Baton Rouge
v. Rebowe, 226 La. 186, 75 So.2d 239 (1954) ; Stouffer v. Board of Liquor Control,
165 Ohio St. 96, 133 N.E.2d 325 (1956) ; and State ex rel. Zugrou v. O'Brien, 130
Ohio St. 23, 196 N.E. 664 (1935).
3 State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S.
59 (1935); Beckenstin v. Liquor Control Commission, 140 Conn. 185, 99 A.2d 119
(1953) ; Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 201 Md. 58, 92 A.2d 560 (1953); and
State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 308, 7 N.E.2d 652 (1937).
4 Gipson v. Morley, 217 Ark. 560, 233 S.W.2d (1950); Reeves v. Simons,
289 Ky. 793, 169 S.V.2d 149 (1942) ; Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, supra note 3;
Supreme Malt Products Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 334 Mass.
59, 133 N.E.2d 775 (1956) ; Butler Oak Tavern v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 20 N.J. 373, 120 A.2d 24 (1956) ; and Nocera Bros. Liquor Mart, Inc. v.
Liquor Control Hearing Board, 81 R.I. 186, 100 A.2d 652 (1953).
5 95 Ohio App. 177, 113 N.E.2d 893 (1952).
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tutional on the ground that a license to deal in alcoholic beverages is a
mere privilege, and as such is not subject to the usual constitutional
checks.
The question as to whether the Board of Liquor Control had acted
ultra vires its delegated authority, however, is a more difficult issue,
leading to one dissent. There can be no doubt that the Board took
into consideration factors other than those relating to fair trading in
fixing the minimum wholesale prices for wine. The preamble to the
regulation establishing the percentage for the minimum markup declares
the policy to be:
... to advance the social control of an alcoholic beverage . . .
to stabilize the sale and distribution of bottled wine in Ohio
• . . to eliminate practices in the sale and distribution of wine
in Ohio Which cause intemperance and improper usage of
bottled wine.
Furthermore, the Board's own witness testified that a twelve percent
markup would have been sufficient had only fair-trade factors been
considered, whereas the markup actually fixed was sixteen percent.'
It is debatable whether the Ohio legislature intended to grant the Board
authority to take into consideration such social factors as temperance
in view of the fact that the title of the bill, which later became Ohio
Revised Code section 4301.13, stated that the act was:
To provide for the sale of bottled wine under fair trade
regulations and for that purpose to authorize the Board of
Liquor Control to adopt such regulations ...
The majority sustained the Board's action by implying that the
purpose of the Act was to ". . absolutely control the liquor industry
in Ohio as a miatter of socab and public policy." (Emphasis is that of
the court.) The relevant case authority tends to uphold the implication
of social objectives where the control of alcoholic beverages is involved.7
In the absence of conflict between administrative action and legislative
directive, the former will stand as not inconsistent with the latter. The
Ohio case of Coady v. Leonard,' is illustrative. There, the Board of
Liquor Control prohibited establishments selling alcoholic beverages
from advertising such commodities by means of outside signs on the
premises. The statute9 under which the Board purported to act authorized
the Board to make uniform regulations governing all advertising of
6The question of whether or not the Board acted arbitrarily in establishing
a minimum lower than the minimum set forth in its own regulation was not raised
by the plaintiff.
7 Schwartz v. Kelly, supra note 2; Mayor v. Savannah Distributing Co., 202
Ga. 559, 43 S.E.2d 704 (1947) ; Reeves v. Simons, supra note 4; Zangerle v. Evatt,
139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942) ; State ex rel. Zugrou v. O'Brien, supra
note 2; Blackman v. Board of Liquor Control, supra note 5; Nocera Bros. Liquor
Mart, Inc. v. Liquor Control Hearing Board, supra note 4.
8 132 Ohio St. 329, 7 N.E.2d 649 (1937).
9 Ofro REV. CODE §4301.03.
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alcoholic beverages throughout the state. The court read this statute in
pari materia with another statute1" which prohibited wholesalers and
manufacturers from making gifts or providing aid to retailers of alco-
holic beverages. The court held that the regulation in question was a
reasonable attempt by the Board to prevent wholesalers and manufac-
turers from evading the statute on gifts and aid to retailers, and therefore
was in furtherance of the policy of the legislature as expressed in the
statutes.
Most courts, however, instead of finding a definite purpose which
the legislature was attempting to accomplish will, at least where alcoholic
beverages are involved, generalize to the effect that -the administrative
agency is bound to "act according to law"'11 or that the regulation must
be "reasonable,"' 2 then proceed to find that the administrative regula-
tion in question is reasonable or lawful. A supporting line of reasoning
is that the understanding of the administrative agency as an expert body
is entitled -to some judicial deference. 3 If, though, the contradiction
between the administrative regulation and the statute under which it was
promulgated is patent, the courts will hold the regulation invalid as
being ultra vires. 14
Lloyd Moore
10 OHIO REV. CODE §4301.24.
11 Stouffer v. Board of Liquor Control, supra note 2.
12 Gaine v. Burnett, 122 N.J.L. 39, 4 A.2d 37 (1939) ; Blackman v. Board of
Liquor Control, supra note 5; Nocera Bros. Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Liquor Control
Hearing Board, supra note 4.
13 American Power and Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Gary v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); and Butler Oak Tavern v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, supra note 4. The court in the case of Coady v. Leonard, supra
note 8, deferred to a considerable extent to the expertise of the Board of Liquor
Control.
14 Allyn's Appeal, 87 Conn. 734, 71 Atl. 794 (1909); Dundalk Liquor Co. v.
Tawes, supra note 3; also see dictum to this effect in Scarborough v. Webb's Cut
Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 772, 8 So. 2d 913 (1942).
